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COMMENTS

1

Multiplication and Division - New
Math for the Courts: New Reproductive
Technologies Create Potential Legal Time
Bombs
I.

Introduction

If a couple wishes to have children, infertility can be a devastating obstacle.' Medical science, however, has made significant ad-

vances in the field of assisted human reproduction.' It is now possible
to unite egg and sperm in the laboratory, and freeze and store the
resulting embryos for later use. 3
Although new reproductive technology may give hope to infertile couples, it may also create a host of problems for the courts. It is
conceivable that an embryo could be frozen and stored beyond the
life span of its parents." If the parents die, the fate of their frozen

embryos is uncertain 5 even if the parents made testamentary6 or conI. In the past, an infertile couple's only alternative to childlessness was adoption.
2. Assisted human reproduction encompasses the medical techniques of artificial insemination, and in vitro fertilization. See infra notes 16-28, 47-49 and accompanying text. The era
of alternative reproductive technology began with the development of artificial insemination
and in vitro fertilization. Artificial insemination involves the "mechanical injection of viable
semen into the vagina." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 147 (C. Thomas ed.
16th ed. 1985) [hereinafter TABER'S]. In vitro fertilization is the "exposure of mature oocytes
[female reproductive cells; eggs] to sperm [ejaculate from the male, containing the male reproductive cells] in vitro [in glass]. After fertilization the ova are then placed in the uterus." Id.
at 662, 939, 1255, 1290, 1714.
3. Seibel, A New Era in Reproductive Technology: In Vitro Fertilization, Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer, and Donated Gametes and Embryos, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 828, 833
(1988).
4. In this Comment, the terms "parents," "mother," and "father" refer to the individuals who supplied the reproductive cells from which the embryo developed.
5. See Smith, Australia's Frozen 'Orphan' Embryos: A Medical, Legal and Ethical Di-
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tractual v provisions for disposition of the embryos. Inheritance issues
are an additional source of legal dilemmas.' In addition, if the parents divorce and are unable to agree over the disposition of stored
embryos, the courts may be asked to resolve the matter.9
At the present time there is little case law or legislation 0 on the
subject of cryopreservation"1 of human embryos. The science of assisted human reproduction has developed more rapidly than has the
law's ability to accommodate its development. Yet, few childless
couples would ignore an opportunity to have children simply because
their marriage might later dissolve, or because they might die prematurely. The use of assisted reproduction is becoming more common." Because legislatures have 'not addressed the use of cryopreservation or the status of frozen embryos, the courts will be
forced to do so. 3 The primary difficulty facing the courts will be the
appropriate characterization of frozen embryos; only then can courts
apply the correct body of law.14
This Comment discusses the technology and legal difficulties associated with assisted human reproduction and focuses on the effect
of the status assigned to a frozen embryo. 5 Section II presents an
lemma, 24 J. FAM. L. 27 (1985-1986) (discussing issues surrounding the fate of frozen embryos after the accidental death of the embryos' parents).
6. Legal problems over control of frozen embryos can arise when the parents attempt to
provide for disposition of their frozen embryos by will, or when the parents die intestate. See
infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
7. The parents' contract with the clinic providing storage service may also provide for
disposition of the embryos in the event of the parents' death.
8. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
9. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496 (Cir. Ct., Blount County, Tenn., Sept. 21, 1989)
(copy on file at Dickinson Law Review office). Davis was a divorce action that included a
dispute over the disposition of seven frozen embryos; custody of the embryos was awarded to
the wife.
10. See generally Robertson, Ethical and Legal Issues in Cryopreservation of Human
Embryos, 47 FERTILITY & STERILITY 371 (1987).
11. Cryopreservation refers to freezing and storing embryos. Specifically, cryopreservation is the "[p]reservation of biological materials, such as tissue, sperm, fluids, blood, or
plasma at very low temperatures. This enables the tissue to be used in another individual at a
later time, as it remains viable after thawing. The technique is used to preserve human semen
for artificial insemination." TABER'S, supra note 2,at 435. There has been little regulation of
the process or of the clinics that provide these services.
12. Seibel, supra note 3, at 834.
13. Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproductive Technologies, 70
A.B.A. J. 50, 54-55 (Aug. 1984).
14. The divorcing couple in Davis, for example, disagreed over whether the frozen embryos were children subject to a custody determination, or property subject to distribution. The
court determined that the frozen embryos were human life, subject to a custody determination.
Davis, at 2, 16.
15. The status assigned to frozen embryos is potentially important in a number of areas
of the law, including: tort law, see infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text; constitutional
law, see infra notes 124-144 and accompanying text; contract law, see infra notes 42, 77 and
accompanying text; trusts and inheritance, see infra note 108 and accompanying text; and
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historical overview of the development of assisted human reproduction and discusses the legal difficulties engendered by its use. Section
Ill examines the argument that a frozen embryo is property, and
Section IV examines the counter-argument that a frozen embryo is
human. Section V offers an alternate characterization of frozen embryos. Section VI summarizes and compares the three characterizations of frozen embryos.
II.

An Historical Overview of Assisted Human Reproduction

A. Artificial Insemination: The Process and the Medical Indications For Its Use
Artificial insemination (AI) is an accepted technique that enables over 20,000 couples each year to have children. 6 The basic
technique has been in use since the 1950s. 7 Al bypasses the act of
copulation by the noncoital injection of semen into the vagina.' 8 Al
is a relatively simple procedure that is generally performed by a physician, though there are reports of women who have inseminated
themselves at home. 9
Al is generally divided into two categories based on the identity
of the sperm donor. If the husband is the sperm donor, the procedure
is termed AIH, or artificial insemination - husband. AIH is used
when the reproductive cells are functional but a failure exists in the
natural delivery system.2 0 AIH can also be used to avoid the transfamily law, see infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
16. Andrews, supra note 13, at 50.
17. Saltarelli, Genesis Retold: Legal Issues Raised by the Cryopreservation of Preim-

plantation Human Embryos, 36

SYRACUSE

L.REV. 1021, 1022 (1985).

18. Intracervical and intrauterine Al are alternative methods that may be used. Intracervical Al involves injection of semen into the cervical canal of the uterus. TABER'S, supra
note 2, at 935. Intrauterine Al involves injection of treated semen into the uterus (the semen is
treated to remove prostaglandins which cause uterine contractions). Id. For a discussion of
these techniques see The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY Supp. I, 34S
(1986) [hereinafter Ethics Committee].
19. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. The description of Al in this section
presumes that the procedure is done by a physician.
20. AIH is indicated if the husband is unable to ejaculate within the vagina, provided
that he retains normal spermatogenesis (which is the "formation of mature functional spermatozoa," TABER'S, supra note 2, at 1715); if the husband suffers from severe hypospadias (a
congenital malformation of the penis where the urethral opening is on the underside rather
than at the tip of the penis. Id. at 878); if the husband suffers from retrograde ejaculation (a
condition in which "seminal fluid is discharged into the bladder rather than to the outside
through the urethra .
" I.
Id. at 563). Ethics Committee, supra note 18, at 34S.
Al is also indicated if the husband suffers from certain conditions related to sperm production, such as oligospermia (insufficient number of spermatozoa. TABER'S, supra note 2, at
1249); poor sperm motility; or antisperm antibodies (antibodies that act against the sperm, see
TABERS, supra note 2, at 11). Ethics Committee, supra note 18, at 34S.
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mission of certain genetic conditions. 2
When donor sperm is used, the procedure is termed AID, or
artificial insemination - donor.2 2 The sperm donor is usually anonymous. In the typical AID situation the wife is fertile but the husband
is not. AID gives these couples an opportunity to have a child with a
genetic link to the wife.2" AID is also indicated if "the husband has
a known hereditary or genetic disorder,24 . . .chromosomal abnormalities, . . . [or] if there has been a potentially mutagenic alteration2 5 in the husband's sperm because of exposure to ionizing radiation, chemotherapy, or other noxious agents." 26 In certain AID
situations the identity of the sperm donor is known. This typically
occurs when the wife is infertile, the husband is fertile, and a surrogate agrees to be inseminated with the husband's sperm.27
Although adoption is an alternative that may be available to
childless couples, many desire a child of their own and are not interested in adoption. Artificial insemination enables these couples to
have a child who will carry on the genetic line of one or both of the
parents. Although Al has been widely available for a number of
21. Al may also be indicated to avoid the transmission of X-linked genetic diseases.
Ethics Committee, supra note 18, at 34S.
22. Id. at 36S.
23. AID is indicated in the following circumstances: When the husband suffers from
azoospermia (an "absence of spermatozoa in the semen." TABER'S, supra note 2, at 175); when
the husband suffers from semen abnormalities that have not responded to treatment (see supra
note 20 and accompanying text); when the husband suffers from ejaculatory dysfunction that
cannot be corrected (ejaculatory dysfunction is an impaired ability to ejaculate semen. See
TABER'S, supra note 2, at 544). Ejaculatory dysfunction can result from "illness, trauma, surgery or medication." Ethics Committee, supra note 18, at 36S. AID is also indicated when the
husband has had a vasectomy. Id.
24. Genetic disorders of concern include: Tay-Sachs ("an inherited disease seen more
frequently among Ashkenazi Jews, characterized by neurological deterioration including
mental and physical retardation, blindness and convulsions; death usually occurs before four
years of age; carriers can be identified by laboratory tests. TABER'S, supra note 2, at 1822);
Huntington's disease (an incurable inherited disorder of the central nervous system, its usual
onset is in adulthood and it is characterized by progressive dementia, abnormal posture and
bizarre involuntary movements. Id. at 846); and hemophilia (an "hereditary blood disorder
characterized by greatly prolonged coagulation time. The blood fails to clot and abnormal
bleeding occurs." Id. at 809). Ethics Committee, supra note 18, at 36S.
25. A mutagenic alteration is an alteration that causes genetic mutation. TABER'S, supra
note 2, at 1163.
26. Ethics Committee, supra note 18, at 36S.
27. The infertile couple may enter a contractual arrangement with a woman who agrees
to be inseminated with the husband's sperm, and to relinquish the child and terminate her
parental rights after the birth of the child. Surrogacy arrangements are not always viewed
favorably by the courts. See generally In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988)
(irrevocable surrogacy contract not containing provision for surrogate to change her mind was
invalid, and amounted to the sale of a child, or to the sale of mother's rights to child); Surrogate Parenting Ass'n, Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986)
(clinic participation did not amount to baby-selling; surrogate has the right to rescind).
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the process has created many legal difficulties.

B. Legal Difficulties
Insemination

Arising

From the

Use

of Artificial

In the past, AIH created few legal difficulties since the child
was the biological offspring of both husband and wife. 2 9 The status
quo is likely to change though, as the ability to test the parentage of
3
children conceived via the use of cryopreserved semen increases. 1
Issues surrounding the use of AID, however, have often been
before the courts. The most frequent challenges have been to the
legitimacy and paternity of AID-conceived children, since the husband is not the biological father of the child. Although most states
now have statutes that legitimize AID children, 3 ' the courts were
faced with these questions long before they were considered by legislatures. 2 Legislative enactments, however, did not put an end to
lawsuits questioning the legitimacy of AID-conceived children.3
Laws in over twenty-five states establish the husband as the legal
father of an AID-conceived child who is borne by his wife.3 4 While
these statutes address a problem in the marital situation, they may
create difficulties in the surrogacy arrangement.3 5
When the husband is infertile, donor sperm may enable a couple
28. Saltarelli, supra note 17, at 1021.
29. See generally People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7
(1968) (noting the lack of legal problems associated with AIH).
30. Tort litigation involving clinics that store frozen semen is likely to increase as evidence of a mix-up in semen specimens becomes easier to obtain. The recent development of
DNA fingerprinting will provide an extremely accurate test for determining paternity in these
cases. See Vogel, The Case of the Unraveling DNA, 11(1) DiSCOVER 46 (1990).
31. Andrews, supra note 13, at 54-55. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1982);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141 (1971); CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. §
19-6-106 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-69i (1980); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 73 (Consol.
1977).
32. Some early cases held that the use of donor sperm constituted adultery by the wife;
the child, therefore, was illegitimate. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406
(1963). Those courts that held the children illegitimate, nonetheless found that the husbands
had a duty of support. Id. at 1085, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 411. See also Anonymous v. Anonymous,
41 Misc. 2d 886, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1964) (husband argued that because his children were
AID-conceived, he was not the father and had no duty to support them). The duty to support
was generally based upon theories of implied contract or equitable estoppel.
33. See Estate of Gordon, 131 Misc. 2d 823, 501 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1986) (fiduciary sought
to exclude two AID-conceived children as contingent remaindermen under a testamentary
trust since the children were conceived prior to enactment of the statute legitimizing AIDconceived children). See also R.S. v. R.S., 9 Kan. App. 2d 39, 670 P.2d 923 (1983) (physician
who obtained the husband's oral consent was unaware of a statute that legitimized AID-conceived children only if the husband gives written consent; in later divorce action, the husband
attempted to disclaim paternity).
34. Those state laws are described in Ethics Committee, supra note 18, at I IS. See also
supra note 31 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
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to have children. When the wife is infertile, however, another uterus
is needed. Infertile couples have dealt with this situation by turning
to surrogate mothers." The surrogate may be a friend or relative
who offers to carry a child for the infertile couple.3 7 The services of a
surrogate may also be obtained through physicians or clinics.3 "
A distinction must be made between a surrogate mother and a
surrogate gestational mother. A surrogate mother is inseminated
with the husband's sperm. If pregnancy occurs, the child carries the
genetic material of the husband and the surrogate mother.39 In contrast, a surrogate gestational mother has no genetic link to the child
she carries."0 The surrogate gestational mother simply serves as host
to an embryo created through in vitro fertilization using ova and semen from the infertile couple.4 1
The use of surrogate gestational mothers promises to create an
interesting and convoluted set of legal problems. For example, it is
well established that the woman who gives birth to a child is legally
recognized as the child's mother. 2 However, if the surrogate gestational mother refuses to relinquish the child to its genetic parents,
the only remedy available to the genetic parents may be a breach of
contract action. Despite the potential problems associated with surrogacy arrangements, couples have begun to take advantage of this
technology.4 3
AID theoretically is available to any fertile female. However,
single women trying to take advantage of the procedure have encountered some obstacles. For instance, most clinics and phyisicans
refuse to inseminate an unmarried woman.4 4 The technology, how36. "The surrogate mother-to-be is artificially inseminated with the husband's sperm;
and, if pregnancy is achieved, she carries the child to term and agrees to relinquish all parental
rights to the child." TABER'S, supra note 2, at 1788.
37. Ethics Committee, supra note 18, at 62S.
38. Id.
39. Ethics Committee, supra note 18, at 62S. Surrogacy generally involves a contractual
agreement between the surrogate mother and the prospective father; the infertile wife is not a
party to the contract. See Surrogate Parenting Ass'n. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong,
704 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Ky. 1986). The surrogate is typically paid a fee and/or medical expenses. Id. at 210-11. The legal validity of these contracts may depend upon whether the
surrogate has a right to rescind. Id. at 213.
40. Ethics Committee, supra note 18, at 58S.
41. Id. This procedure is possible if the infertile wife retains her ovaries and can produce
viable ova, but is unable to carry a child to term. The embryo is created through in vitro
fertilization; it carries the genetic material of the husband and infertile wife, and is implanted
into the uterus of the surrogate mother.
42. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 53.
43. The first reported birth of a child to a surrogate gestational mother occurred in
1985. Ethics Commitee, supra note 18, at 58S.
44. Id. at 36S.
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ever, is simple. Some women have even performed the procedure
themselves.45 Legal problems arise in self-insemination cases when
the putative semen donor wishes to exercise parental rights.46
C. The History and Process of In Vitro Fertilization and
Cryopreservation
The first successful human in vitro fertilization (IVF) occurred
in England, in 1978. 47 Since then, the extracorporeal fertilization of
human ova and subsequent transfer into the uterus has become an
accepted method by which to achieve pregnancy. More than 3000
children have been born through the use of this technique,4 8 and
more than 100 clinics in the United States treat infertility using
IVF. 49
Advances in scientific technology have made it possible to freeze
and store embryos created through IVF.50 The embryos are first
treated with a solution to protect them from damage during freezing.6 ' They are then gradually cooled to a temperature of -60 to -80
degrees centigrade and placed in liquid nitrogen for long-term storage. 2 Approximately thirty-five percent of the frozen embryos do
45. See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K. 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 390, 224 Cal Rptr. 530, 532
(1986) (nurse inseminated herself with semen donated by a friend); C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J.
Super. 160, 161, 377 A.2d 821, 821 (1977) (woman inseminated herself at home using glass
syringe and jar).
46. See, e.g., C.M. 152 N.J. at 160, 377 A.2d at 821 (semen donor brought suit to
obtain visitation rights; the court granted visitation, noting that public policy favors a child
having a mother and a father). See also Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 224 Cal. Rptr.
at 537 (semen donor brought suit to obtain visitation rights and establish paternity; the court
granted both).
47. Dickey, The Medical Status of the Embryo, 32 Loy. L. REV. 317 (1986). Although
IVF is technically successful if egg and sperm unite and cell division begins, until there was a
live birth of an IVF-conceived child the procedure was not considered successful. The birth of
Louise Brown signaled the success of this procedure.
48. Seibel, supra note 3, at 828.
49. Id. The prospective mother is generally given clomiphene citrate, human menopausal
gonadotropin (hMG), urofollitropin, or a gonadotropin-releasing hormone agonist in a variety
of sequences or combinations, depending upon clinic protocol, to stimulate the production and
simultaneous maturation of multiple ova. Id. at 829. Her hormone levels are monitored and
the ova are harvested just before anticipated ovulation. Id. Egg retrieval is usually done under
general anesthesia by laparoscopy, or under local anesthesia via ultrasonography guided needle
aspiration. Id. at 829-30. The harvested eggs are held in a culture media for five to twentyfour hours. Sperm is then added to the media and the mix is incubated overnight. Id. at 830. If
fertilization has occurred, the embryos are incubated until cell division to the four-cell stage
has occurred, and then implanted in the mother. Id. If the embryo successfully implants in the
uterine lining a normal pregnancy follows. Id. at 830-31. Collection of semen from the male is
much less involved; he simply masterbates to ejaculation. Id. at 830, 832.
50. Saltarelli, supra note 17, at 1028.
51. Id. at 1028 n.44.
52. Id.
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not survive the thawing process.5 Because the use of this technology
in human reproduction is a relatively recent development,5 4 the longest recorded storage of viable human embryos is two years. 5 Animal
embryos have been successfully frozen and stored for much longer
periods. Mouse embryos, for example, have remained viable after ten
years of storage.58 Theoretically, human embryos could have a similar shelf-life."
The availability of cryopreservation has made the process of
IVF much easier and less hazardous for the prospective mother.
Prior to the development of cryopreservation, a woman had to undergo anesthesia and abdominal surgery for each IVF attempt. The
average rate of successful pregnancy resulting from each IVF attempt is approximately fourteen percent.5 8 The ability to harvest and
fertilize multiple ova and to freeze the resulting embryos means that
a woman no longer needs to take medication or undergo abdominal
surgery for each pregnancy attempt. If the first IVF attempt does
not result in pregnancy, the remaining frozen embryos are available
for. future attempts.
D. IVF and CryopreservationMay Create an Assortment of Legal
Quagmires
Although the absolute shelf-life of a frozen embryo has not yet
been determined, 9 even the present two-year storage life gives rise
to some interesting questions. For example, if an IVF attempt is successful, but unused frozen embryos remain, they are available for a
second pregnancy attempt. It is possible, however, that the couple
may not want additional children. This would leave both the frozen
embryos and their fate in stasis.
The premature death of the couple could also leave the fate of
their frozen embryos uncertain. This scenario did in fact occur in
Australia."0 In response to this problem, the Parliament of Victoria
53. Dickey, supra note 47, at 333.
54. Cryopreservation has been widely used with animals for at least ten years. Seibel,
supra note 3, at 833.
55. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496 at Appendix BlO (Cir. Ct., Blount County, Tenn.,
Sept. 21, 1989) (copy on file at Dickinson Law Review office).
56. Id.
57. The possibility of long-term storage of human embryos raises a series of interesting
questions. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
58. Seibel, supra note 3, at 831.
59. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
60. Saltarelli, supra note 17, at 1030. In this instance, a married couple attempted IVF.
Two embryos were frozen and stored for later attempts. Before the frozen embryos could be
used, both husband and wife were killed in an airplane crash.
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passed legislation to regulate the fate of frozen embryos. 6 Legislatures in the United States, however, have not yet addressed the questions raised by cryopreservation.6 2
The fate of frozen embryos may also be an issue if the parents
divorce. This situation occurred recently in Tennessee.13 Seven frozen embryos were the focus of a legal tug-of-war between the parents. Arguing that they were her children, the mother sought custody of the frozen embryos in order to continue her attempts to
achieve pregnancy. " The father, opposed to any further attempts to
implant the embryos, argued that the frozen embryos were property.6 1 The court held that life begins at conception, and that frozen
embryos are children. 66 The court also held that it was in the best
interests of the "child or children in vitro" to give temporary custody
to the mother and allow her to implant the embryos.6"
A number of other potential problems may exist in the event of
a divorce. The mother or father may wish to have the embryos destroyed. Conversely, either or both parents may want to have the
embryos implanted.6 8 Either parent could also wish to use the frozen
embryos as a weapon against the other. Finally, if the embryos are
characterized as human life, the state may also want to assert an
interest.
As cryopreservation becomes more common the courts will be
forced to deal with issues concerning this procedure. Although technology has outpaced the law, these issues will not simply evaporate.
These questions must be addressed and examined in light of existing
legal theory. A comprehensive and logical examination of competing
arguments will reveal whether frozen embryos can be made to fit
within the existing legal framework.
61. The legislation requires couples, before undertaking IVF, to decide upon and specify
the future disposition of their stored embryos. If the parents fail to do so and die prematurely,
or if they lose contact with the clinic, the embryos are made available for donation to another
woman. Id. at 1032.
62. Robertson, supra note 10, at 372.
63. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, slip op. at I (Cir. Ct., Blount County, Tenn., Sept. 21,
1989) (copy on file at Dickinson Law Review office).
64. Id. at Appendix B12-13.
65. Id. at Appendix B3-4.
66. Id. at 2.
67. Id.
68. The father could be willing to allow his ex-wife to have the embryos implanted or
could wish to arrange for implantation into a surrogate in order to have and raise his own
biological offspring.
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Is A Frozen Embryo A Form Of Property?
Property Defined

Lay persons tend to think of property as some "thing" that is
owned, such as land, a house or a car. In law, however, property is
regarded as the rights that attach to the "thing." 69 Property is, in
essence, "a legally protected 'expectation' of deriving certain advantages from a 'thing' . .. "I This concept of property focuses on the
"legal relations between persons with respect to 'things.' "171 When
applied to a frozen embryo, this view of property focuses on the
"rights, privileges, powers and immunities '7 2 of each party claiming
a property interest in the frozen embryo.
B.

Characteristicsof Property

Property law in the United States recognizes a number of expectations that will be protected by the courts.7 3 The law, for example, protects an owner's right to possession, exclusion, disposition and
use.7 ' The law also protects the right to enjoy the fruits or profits of
an object as well as the right to destroy it.7 5
I. The Right of Possession.-If a frozen embryo is considered
property, its owner 76 has a legally protected right to possess it. Because the frozen embryo is a tangible object, possession is certainly
possible. However, since the embryo must be stored in liquid nitrogen, actual possession by the owner is rare. When actual possession
rests with a fertility clinic, the relationship between the clinic and
the owner can be viewed as a bailment, 77 with the actual claim of
right to possession resting with the owner.
69. CUNNINGHAM.
inafter CUNNINGHAM].
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.

STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY §

1.2 (1984) [here-

supra note 69.
Id.
For purposes of the present discussion, the owner of a frozen embryo is the couple
the egg and sperm.
A bailment is defined as:
[a] delivery of goods or personal property, by one person to another, in trust
for the execution of a special object upon or in relation to such goods, beneficial
either to the bailor or bailee or both, and upon a contract, express or implied, to
perform the trust and carry out such object, and thereupon either to redeliver
the goods to the bailor or otherwise dispose of the same in conformity with the
purpose of the trust.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 129 (5th ed. 1979).
74.

75.
76.
providing
77.

CUNNINGHAM,
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Possession alone is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish
ownership. As illustrated by the example of a bailment, one easily
may own a "thing" that is not in one's possession. The reverse is also
true: one may possess an item without owning it. A parent has, in
effect, what can be described as a possessory right to his or her child.
The law terms this possessory right "custody." 78 Despite this possessory right, the parent does not own the child.7"
The possessory right to one's child is not absolute. For example,
when the child is a victim of abuse or neglect, the state may intervene and deprive one or both parents of their possessory interest in
the child. The justification for deprivation of this possessory interest
lies in the protection of the child's welfare. 0 Courts may also deprive
a parent of custody if the parents divorce. The court's paramount
concern in a custody dispute is determining the best interests of the
child."'
Defining frozen embryos as property would require that the possessory right be attached to ownership of the embryo, rather than to
custody of it. The best interests of the embryo could not be considered; instead, possession would rest upon the court's division of the
marital property incident to the divorce."
2.
78.

The Right of Exclusion.-The right of exclusion encom-

Custody is defined as:
[tihe care and control of a thing or person. The keeping, guarding, care,
watch, inspection, preservation or security of a thing, carrying with it the idea of
the thing being within the immediate personal care and control of the person to
whose custody it is subjected. Immediate charge and control, and not the final
absolute control of ownership, implying responsibility for the protection and
preservation of the thing in custody ....
Id. at 347.
79. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I. A frozen embryo cannot be both property and a
child. Property is owned, and the United States Constitution prohibits the ownership of persons. Id. Therefore, if a frozen embryo can be owned, it cannot be a person.
80. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The best interests of the child may
warrant governmental intervention. Protection of the welfare of a minor child is a legitimate
state interest, "well within the power of the State to implement." Id. at 652.
81. In re Custody of Carlisle, 225 Pa. Super. 181, 183, 310 A.2d 280, 282 (1973) (in
custody dispute, the court's paramount concern is the best interest of the child).
82. A discussion of the multitude of state laws governing divorce and property division is
beyond the scope of this Comment. As personal property, the frozen embryos would be subject
to the laws of the state in which the owners are domiciled. Ancillary conflict-of-law questions
may arise where the parties acquire the frozen embryo in one jurisdiction and later move,
transferring the frozen embryos to a clinic in the new jurisdiction. If, for example, the embryo
is acquired in one jurisdiction it takes on the characteristics of marital property in that jurisdiction. If the owners move to a state with significantly different marital property laws, the
frozen embryo's property characteristics may shift to those in the new jurisdiction. Additional
property division issues may arise when, at separation, one party moves to a different jurisdiction and files for divorce. See, e.g., J.B. KELLY, PA. MARRIAGE. DIVORCE. CUSTODY, PROPERTY
AND SUPPORT, §§ 8-1 to 8-10 (1985).
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passes the right to exclude others from possession of and interference
with the property."' The law recognizes and protects this right. A
cause of action for a violation of this right may exist as trespass to
chattels, 4 conversion," or negligence,8" depending upon the nature
of the interference.
The concept of a right of exclusion could theoretically be applied to a frozen embryo and could be recognized by a court of law.
There may be difficulty in assessing damages, however, if the embryo
was implanted into the wrong woman or was inadvertently destroyed. If implanted into the wrong woman it would presumably be
subject to custody laws upon birth because it would no longer have
the characteristics of property. It is unlikely that a court would order
a living child of birth parents returned to the owners of the frozen
embryo under a property theory. 7 The question of appropriate remedy, in those circumstances, is not easily answered.
Additional issues arise if, in the same scenario, the woman in
whom the embryo has been mistakenly implanted chooses to abort
the fetus.8 8 The pregnant woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy remains her choice subject only to state laws regulating the
procedure.89 Since the embryo could not be returned to its owner,
and the owner could not prevent the abortion under existing law,9
the only remaining remedy may be an action for damages.
The owners of the frozen embryo could also argue that they retain a property interest in the product of the abortion, and that they
have a right to have the remains interred, and conduct a funeral.
Abortion, however, removes maternal as well as fetal tissue. The wo83. The term "property" describes "ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a
thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude
everyone else from interfering with it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1095 (5th ed. 1979).
84. KEETON. DOBBS, KEETON & OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 14 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
85. See generally Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969) cert. denied, 395
U.S. 947 (1969) for an excellent discussion of tangible versus intangible property and physical
conversion versus non-physical conversion.
86.

See generally PROSSER, supra note 84, at § 30. It may be negligent for a custodial

clinic, through an act or omission, to allow the embryos to thaw, or to mislabel, or implant the
embryos in the wrong woman.
87. A court would not subject a child to property laws simply because it had once been a
frozen embryo and had been property at that time. The frozen embryo would no longer exist
as such, and the court would likely hold that the frozen embryo had undergone such a change
in characteristics that it no longer met any definition of property.
88. The term "embryo" refers to the human young from the time of fertilization until
the beginning of the third month of gestation. TABER'S, supra note 2, at 576-77. The term
"fetus" refers to "the developing young in the uterus; applied especially to the human young
from the third to the ninth month" of gestation. Id.
89. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
90. Id. at 165.
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man who had the abortion could have a claim to that portion of the
aborted tissue that was her own body tissue. Separation of maternal
and fetal aborted tissue is, as a practical matter, impossible. The
host mother could theoretically thwart the biological parents' claim
to their embryo's remains since the parents have no legal claim to
the surrogate's tissue. The host mother could also argue that the
growth of the embryo was the result of her body processes. Under a
labor theory"' of property acquisition, she would have her own property claim to the fetus.
3. The Right of Disposition.-The right to dispose of property
by sale, gift or devise is a basic characteristic of property.92 This
right is not unfettered; a valid disposition of property may have to
meet certain criteria. A gift, for example, must meet certain common law requirements in order to be valid.9 3 A valid legacy, bequest
or devise must meet a host of common law and statutory requirements.9 4 In most. instances, property is freely alienable if the requirements of the particular mode of disposition are met.
Courts vary in their recognition of a property right that encompasses the right to dispose of human bodies or body parts. 95 California courts, for example, have not recognized a next-of-kin's property
right to a corpse, although they do recognize a quasi-property interest for the limited purpose of burial.96 Georgia courts also recognize,
for the purpose of burial, that relatives of the deceased have a quasiproperty interest in the body of the deceased. 7
91. The labor theory of property acquisition suggests than when an individual produces
or acquires something through individual labor, he or she has a moral right to ownership.
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 69, at § 1.2; see also Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500, 506-07
(1891) (Plaintiff raked horse manure into piles, intending to collect it the following day. Defendant found the piles and appropriated them. The court held that plaintiff had acquired
ownership via his labor.).
92. See supra note 83.
93. A valid gift requires donative intent, delivery (actual, symbolic or constructive) and
acceptance. See generally, In re Cohn, 187 A.D. 392, 176 N.Y.S. 225 (1919).
94. Consideration of all the rules and ramifications of a valid legacy, bequest, or devise
is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a general discussion of these topics, see T. ATKINSON. WILLS (2d ed. 1953).
95. See Cohen v. Groman Mortuary Inc., 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1964)
(quasi-property interest in corpse); Georgia Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 255 Ga. 60, 335 S.E.2d
127 (1985) (same). But see Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 138 Mich. App. 683, 360
N.W.2d 275 (1984) (no property right in dead body).
96. Cohen, 231 Cal. App. 2d at 4, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
97. See LaVant, 255"Ga. at 61, 335 S.E.2d at 128. Lavant involved a suit for damages
for the removal of a dead infant's corneas without notifying or receiving permission from the
mother. The court upheld a Georgia statute that permits removal if no objection is made by
the next-of-kin. The court reasoned that there is a common law quasi-property interest in dead
bodies, but that interest is subject to legislative change.

95

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

FALL

1990

Courts also vary in their recognition of a property right in one's
own body tissues. The California Supreme Court has recently declared that an individual does not have a property right in his own
body tissues.9 8 A Maryland court held that an individual may, in
certain circumstances, assert a property interest in his bodily
wastes." A frozen embryo, if property, is unquestionably created
from body tissue and possesses characteristics which merit at least
the same level of consideration given to body tissues.
A frozen embryo, as property, would be subject to sale, gift, or
devise at the will of the owner. While individuals may sell their
blood or semen, society does not permit the sale of a kidney or a
lung. 10° Blood and semen are, in effect, renewable body products;
major organs are not. The social and moral ramifications of permitting the sale of major bodily organs are immense. Society does not
permit this practice, in part because of the potential for exploitation
of the financially disadvantaged. Although the seller could exist
quite comfortably with one kidney and sell the other, we simply do
not permit him to do so.
The law is unlikely to condone the sale of frozen embryos. The
sale of a child for adoption is not permitted.0 We, as a society, are
also unlikely to permit a woman to sell her ova. The sale of ova
engenders the same potential for exploitation as does the sale of body
98. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rtpr. 146
(1990).
99. Venner v. State, 30 Md. App. 599, 354 A.2d 483 (1976). This case involved the
seizure of balloons filled with hashish oil, retrieved from a bedpan containing Venner's feces.
The court concluded that Venner had abandoned the feces because he had not attempted to
assert any ownership rights to the fecal material after excreting it. The court noted, however,
that:
It could not be said that a person has no property right in wastes or other
materials which were once a part of or contained within his body, but which
normally are discarded after their separation from the body. It is not unknown
for a person to assert a continuing right of ownership, dominion, or control, for
good reason or for no reason, over such things as excrement, fluid waste, secretions, hair, fingernails, toenails, blood, and other organs or other parts of the
body, whether their separation from the body is intentional, accidental, or
merely the result of normal body functions.
But it is all but universal human custom and human experience that such
things are discarded - in a legal sense, abandoned - by the person from whom
they emanate, either 'on the spot', or, if social delicacy requires it, at a place or
in a manner designed to cause the least offense to others.
By the force of social custom, we hold that when a person does nothing and
says nothing to indicate an intent to assert his right of ownership, possession, or
control over such material, the only rational inference is that he intends to abandon the material.
Id. at 626-27, 354 A.2d at 498-99.
100. See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 367-f (Deering 1985) (prohibiting sale of body organs for transplantation).
101. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1983-84).
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organs."0 2
The law does, however, permit donation rather than the sale of
body organs.' The factors that weigh against the sale of organs are
not present in organ donation. Although children are not considered
property, the law does permit the "donation" of children for the limited purpose of adoption." °4 If permitted, the right to donate frozen
embryos would probably be as restricted as the right to donate body
organs or children. It is unlikely, however, that the law would permit
the donation of frozen embryos for the purpose of experimentation. 10 5 If a frozen embryo is true property, such prohibitions would
constitute a restraint on alienation,' which is a disfavored concept
in property law."0 7
A frozen embryo, if property, could also be bequeathed, 0 8 but
could not be the recipient of a legacy, bequest, or devise.' A frozen
embryo could, for instance, be bequeathed to a fertility clinic for
donation to another individual. This would raise inheritance
problems only if the child, once delivered, is not considered the child
of the birth mother." 0 If a child who was once a frozen embryo is
considered a child of the birth mother, then we are once again con102. The procedure is not risk-free. The woman must take medication that stimulates
multiple egg maturation and undergo surgery to retrieve the eggs. See supra note 49 and
accompanying text. The sale of semen, however, is treated differently. The collection of semen
involves no significant health risk, and is a non-invasive procedure. The male produces the
semen privately; no medical procedure is involved.
103. See generally Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1230, 1248, 249
Cal. Rptr. 494, 504 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal.
Rptr. 146 (1990).
104. See In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 426, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240-41 (1988).
105. In other countries fetal tissue has been implanted into individuals suffering from
Parkinson's Disease. The theory behind this research is that fetal dopamine-producing cells
will replace the non-functioning cells in the Parkinson's patient. The fetal cells should produce
the missing dopamine, which would slow the progress of or reverse the symptoms of the disease. See Beardsley, Aborted Research, 262(2) Sci. AM. 16 (1990); The Washington Post,
Nov. 2, 1989, at A3, col. I. Note that some statutes prohibit the sale of or experimentation
upon a fetus. These statutes could be interpreted to include cryopreserved embryos. See, e.g.,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1593 (1980).
106. "A 'restraint on alienation' is any provision in a trust or other instrument which,
either by express terms or by implication purports to prohibit or penalize the use of the power
" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (5th ed. 1979).
of alienation ....
107. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 69, at §§ 2.15, 2.2.
108. Personal property that is bequeathed is given to another by will. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 145 (5th ed. 1979).
109. Property cannot inherit property. See In re Estate of Russell, 69 Cal. 2d 200, 444
P.2d 353, 70 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968); In re Searight's Estate, 87 Ohio App. 417, 95 N.E.2d 779
(1950).
110. If a child who was once a frozen embryo is not considered the child of the woman
who gave birth to that child, and if the birth mother died intestate, the child will not inherit. It
is probable that the law will treat children produced from frozen embryos in the same manner
that it treats children conceived through artificial insemination. That is, as the child of the
birth couple. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-69-f - n (1980).
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fronted with problems concerning the use of a surrogate gestational
mother.'1 1 One can conceive of some interesting family situations in
which, for example, a mother could bequeath her stored frozen embryo to her adult daughter, who would then give birth to her own
sister or brother.
4. The Right to Use.-The right to freely use one's property is
an important characteristic of property. This right is restricted only
to the extent that the chosen use infringes upon another's rights. An
individual is free, for example, to use his or her property to the extent that the use does not create a nuisance.12
If a frozen embryo is property, its owners are presumably free
to use it to the extent that the chosen use does not interfere with the
rights of others. Therefore, the owners would be free to use it to
achieve pregnancy, and would also be free to use it for any private
medical purpose chosen by the owner." 3 If a frozen embryo is true
property, its use for medical purposes would not infringe upon the
rights of any other person. The frozen embryo, as property, would
have no rights.
5. The Right to Enjoy the Fruits or Profits of Property.-The
property owner has the right to enjoy the fruits and profits of both
real and personal property." 4 Whatever the property produces
clearly belongs to its owner. Therefore, if a frozen embryo is property it is subject to use or sale by its owner. The use could be any
one its owner chooses, as long as that use does not interfere with the
rights of others. Sale of the frozen embryo could be limited only to
the extent that any sale of personal property is similarly restricted. 1' 5
If the frozen embryo is considered property equivalent to human
tissue, then its character is closer in kind to that of blood and semen
than to an organ such as a kidney. The embryo's components, the
ova and sperm of its parents, are better classified as renewable body
111. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
112. Rodrigue v. Copeland, 475 So.2d 1071 (La. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1262
(1986) (private Christmas display with lights and loudspeakers drew considerable traffic to the
neighborhood and was subject to injunction as a result).
113. Such freedom leaves the owner free to use the embryo for a parent with Parkinson's Disease if the technology is developed. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. Since
most states restrict experimentation on aborted fetuses, it would be useless to attempt to implant the embryo solely for the purpose of aborting a fetus to obtain the necessary fetal tissue.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001 (6), (7) (West Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22
§ 1593 (1980).
114. See generally CUNNINGHAM, supra note 69, at § 1.2.
115. See e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 443-A:1-12 (1983) (regulating the sale of
animals).
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tissues, rather than organs that can be essential to the life of the
donor. Hence, a frozen embryo that is sold could yield profits for its
owner without causing irreparable or life-threatening harm to its
16

donor.1

6. The Right to Destroy Property.-An owner has the right to
destroy his or her personal property." 7 This right extends to life itself, for an owner may euthanize a pet without legal sanction, when
it is done in a humane manner." ' A fetus may be destroyed, subject
to state and constitutional limitations,"' when the woman carrying it
opts for abortion. If a fetus may be destroyed, then surely a frozen
embryo, if property, may also be destroyed. It is not clear, however,
whether each parent would have a unilateral right to destroy the frozen embryo, or whether the decision of both parents would be required.' 2 0 A woman's decision to abort is unilateral, and it is clear
that the father of the fetus does not have any right to demand that it
be aborted. 2 ' If the frozen embryo is created through in vitro fertilization using the sperm of an anonymous donor, and that embryo is
the property of an unmarried woman, she clearly has the exclusive
right to destroy it. 122 If a frozen embryo is property subject to property division if the parents divorce, the decision to destroy the frozen
embryo would clearly rest exclusively with the party to whom the
embryo was awarded.' 2 3
116.
117.

See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 69, at § 1.2.

118.

See e.g., N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 4:22-17 (West 1973) (cruelty to animals).

119. See generally, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
120. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 315 U.S. 535 (1942) (discussing the right to father
children).
121. Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth 428 U.S. 52 (1976). "Clearly, since the
State cannot regulate or proscribe abortions during the first stage, when the physician and his
patient make that decision, the State cannot delegate authority to any particular person, even
the spouse, to prevent abortion during that same period." Id. at 69. "The obvious fact is that
when the wife and husband disagree on this decision, the view of only one of the two marriage
partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is
more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance
weighs in her favor." Id. at 71.
122. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-69-j (1980). This statute is representative of a
number of state statutes which provide that an anonymous sperm donor has no rights or interests in an AID-conceived child.
123. A thorough discussion of the ramifications of joint ownership and marital property
is beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally CUNNINGHAM, supra note 69 at §§ 5.2,
5.3; KELLY, supra note 82, at §§ 8-1 to 8-16 (1985).
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Classifying a frozen embryo as a human being necessarily imbues the embryo with rights, some of which are constitutionally protected.124 The Constitution provides that neither the federal government 125 nor the state1" 6 may deprive the individual of, or interfere
with, certain individual rights. The law is clear that certain rights
are equally applicable to all human beings. 27 The law is equally
clear that certain rights are not equally applicable to all individuals.
The rights of children are not, for example, co-extensive with the
rights of adults.' 2 8 The state may deny a child access to certain
printed materials that it could not deny to an adult.' 29 The state may
also limit a child's first amendment free speech rights to a greater
extent than it may limit the free speech of an adult.'1 ° The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that a school's imposition of
corporal punishment "implicates a [child's] constitutionally protected liberty interest."'' 3 That liberty interest is limited, 32 however,
and imposition of corporal punishment does not trigger the due pro33
cess requirements of notice and a hearing before its imposition.1
Deprivation of a property interest, however, is sufficient to trigger
these requirements,13 1 though the actual amount of process due is
124. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X, XiII, XIV.
125. Id. at amends. I-X.
126. Id. at amend. XIV.
127. For example, a comatose or a mentally impaired individual is entitled to substantive due process, and cannot be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
128. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1968), in which the Court
stated that material not designated as obscene for an adult reader may be designated obscene
for children. Id. at 638-39. The Court noted that the state has greater control over a child's
conduct than it has over the conduct of an adult. Id.
129. Id.
130. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 567 (1988) (first amendment rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the free speech
rights of adults).
131. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-74 (1977).
132. Id. at 675. There are historical limitations on a child's liberty interest in avoiding
corporal punishment. Such punishment is a long-standing tradition and is seen as an accommodation to the state's effort to educate the child. Id. at 676.
133. Id. at 682. The availability of tort remedies provides sufficient protection of the
liberty interest in question. Id. at 672. The Court refused to find that the beating.of school
children violates the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
at 671. Justice White pointed out in his dissent that a criminal who is beaten while in state
custody is entitled to eighth amendment protection, but a child who is beaten while in state
custody is not. Id. at 689 (White, J., dissenting).
134. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (suspension of a student deprives him of a
property interest in his education).
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minimal.' 3 5
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that a number
of constitutionally protected rights are implicated when a child is
charged with an offense. 3 ' In Thompson v. Oklahoma,13 7 a plurality
of the Court held that the state's deprivation of an individual's life
triggers a different level of constitutional protection when the accused committed the offense as a child.138 The Court also held that
the execution of an individual who was fifteen at the time of the
crime violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments." 9 Although
Thompson was a plurality decision, all of the participating Justices
agreed that there is some unspecified age below which the state may
40
not execute a child.'
The Supreme Court has made it clear that certain rights are
guaranteed to adults and children, but that the rights of children are
not always coextensive with those guaranteed to adults.' 4' If a frozen
embryo is a human being, then logically some of the rights applicable to adults and to children should also apply to the frozen embryo.
Because a child's rights are often less extensive than an adult's, a
frozen embryo's rights may be less extensive than a child's. If, however, the frozen embryo is a human being, then it must have some
constitutionally protected rights. The difficult task, then, is to identify which rights are guaranteed to the frozen embryo, and to what
extent.' 4 2
135. "[S]tudents facing suspension and the consequent interference with a protected
property interest must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing." Id. at
579 (emphasis in original).
136. Although a number of rights are protected, they are not necessarily protected to
the same extent as the rights of an adult. In a proceeding which could result in incarceration, a
child is entitled to a number of constitutional protections. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967). For
example, the state must prove a child guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 368 (1970). A child is protected against double jeopardy. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S.
519 (1975). Furthermore, a juvenile court may not waive its jurisdiction (in favor of an adult
court) without a hearing. Gault, 387 U.S. at 32. This hearing need not meet the requirements
of a criminal trial, but must carry with it "the essentials of due process and fair treatment."
Id. The child is entitled to notice of the charges against him. Id. at 33. He or she also has the
right to counsel. Id. at 36. "[Tlhe constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults." Id. at 55. "Absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot
be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance with our law and constitutional requirements." ld, at 57.
137. 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2695-96 (Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun), 2706 (Justice
O'Connor), 2718 (Justices Scalia, Rehnquist and White).
141. See supra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
142. Some constitutional rights seem logically inapplicable to a frozen embryo. For instance, it is difficult to imagine how a frozen embryo could exercise certain rights, such as free
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Because there is an unstated age below which a child adjudged
guilty of a capital offense may not be executed,143 it follows logically
that a child who is not charged with a crime cannot be deprived of
life without due process of law. Theoretically, any state statute that
purports to regulate the cryopreservation of embryos, and that provides for the destruction of unused embryos, could be characterized
as state action that deprives the individual embryo of life without
due process of law.144 Arguably, legislation that delegates that decision to the parents could be similarly characterized. Destruction of
individual unused embryos could, theoretically, be challenged if an
individual could establish standing to sue on behalf of the frozen
embryo.
Additional issues may arise if the frozen embryo is subject to
state regulations controlling its storage. If a frozen embryo is a
human being then it must have some rights independent of the rights
of its parents. Regulations that give the parents the exclusive right to
implant the embryo obviously limit the embryo's right to life. Although parents have some rights to their children, those rights are
not absolute. 1 45 If the embryo's right to live is greater than its parents' right to control its implantation, then once created, the embryo
should be available to the first woman willing to attempt pregnancy
with it. Whether the state's interest in ensuring the embryo's right to
life outweighs the parents' interest in using their own frozen embryos
is a decision for the legislatures or the courts.14 State regulations
mandating the frozen storage of an embryo pending use by its parents also arguably deprive the embryo of a liberty interest. It is not
entirely clear that an embryo has, from the moment of its creation,
the right to be implanted into the first willing recipient. It can be
argued, though, that the embryo's right to be implanted into any
recipient becomes stronger as the limit of its storage life nears.
speech.
143. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
144. The same deprivation of due process argument can be applied to the life of the
fetus. Since a fetus is more advanced in terms of its growth and development than a frozen
embryo, it is unlikely that a right to life argument will succeed for a frozen embryo when it
fails for a fetus.
145. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S: 645, 652 (1972) (discussing a father's
rights).
146. During the first trimester of pregnancy, the woman's right to control her body is
greater than the state's interest in limiting abortion. See generally, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). Here, however, the frozen embryo is not yet inside the woman's body and the state
may have a greater interest in protecting the ex utero embryo than in protecting the life of the
fetus when the fetus and woman are essentially one being.
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Implantation of the Frozen Embryo Creates a Paradox

The successful implantation of a frozen embryo gives rise to a
legal paradox. Even if the frozen embryo is accorded human status,
it is unclear whether the embryo is also a person within the meaning
of the law. Although the Constitution clearly protects the rights of
persons, human status alone may not be sufficient to trigger constitutional protection . 4 7 Roe v. Wade " 8 remains valid law, since the decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services' 9 did not command a majority of the Justices on the Court. Using the reasoning of
Roe, a frozen embryo, once implanted, is not a person and is therefore subject to its mother's decision to abort.' 5 If a frozen embryo is
a human being prior to implantation, under the logic of Roe, the
embryo loses its personhood at implantation.'' To the extent that a
frozen embryo is accorded human rights prior to implantation, those
rights would terminate upon implantation, and would not vest again
until the fetus reaches viability. 52 Any state statute that regulates
cryopreservation could, therefore, be characterized as state action
which deprives the frozen embryo of a protected interest in life itself.
If a frozen embryo is characterized as a human being, a paradox is
created. A fetus is an in utero nonperson. A frozen embryo is ex
utero, and if considered a human being should also logically be a
person. If a frozen embryo is ex utero, and is a human being, then it
must also be a person. The law has no category for a human being
who is not a person, but who is also not in utero.
C. Selected Individual Rights and Frozen Embryos
If a frozen embryo is a human being, it has property interests
deserving of some level of constitutional protection. Any legislative
action that impinges upon the frozen embryo's ability to inherit, for
example, affects its property interests. Characterization of a frozen
embryo as a human being could conceivably allow the embryo to be
considered a life in being for inheritance law purposes.1 53 If the frozen embryo is a life in being and if technological advances allow us
147. See US. CONST. amends. 1, IV, V, IX, X, XIV.
148. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
149. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989.).
150. 410 U.S. at 164.
151. When a frozen embryo is implanted, pregnancy results and the in utero fetus would
not become a person within the meaning of the law until it reached viability.
152. 410 U.S. at 163.
153. A life in being is a concept in property and inheritance law, referring to the "remaining duration of the life of a person who is in existence at the time when the deed or will
[in question] takes effect. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 833 (5th ed. 1979).
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to increase the storage life of frozen embryos, the Rule Against Perpetuities could become ineffective.' 5 4
A frozen embryo, if a human being, is subject to a custody determination upon the divorce of its parents. As a general rule, custody determinations rest upon consideration of the best interests of
the child. 1' 5 Although the statutory and common law presumably
meet due process requirements sufficient to protect parental interests
in the child,' 156 it is not clear that the custody of a frozen embryo
necessarily gives the custodial parent a right to implant the embryo.
There is a common law presumption that a child born of a marriage
is the legitimate offspring of the parties to the marriage." 7 If the
frozen embryo's custodial parent remarries, and later implants the
frozen embryo, the resulting child will be considered the lawful child
of the present couple, effectively terminating the noncustodial biological parent's parental rights. 158
The possibility exists that, in a divorce, frozen embryos could be
used by one party as a weapon against the other, as children often
are.15 In the case of frozen embryos, the underlying desire for implantation may be an effort to tie a divorced partner to a relationship
that he or she no longer wants. This is most likely to occur in a
situation where one party wants to divorce and the other party does
not. Although it may appear easy to argue that no one would willingly undergo a pregnancy simply to create ties to an unwilling partner, reality demands the acknowledgement that it could in fact happen. The possibility that this could occur, and the fact that it could
154. The Rule Against Perpetuities is a principle designed to restrict the ability of an
individual to control his estate long after his death. It is the "[p]rinciple that no interest in
property is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years, plus the period of gestation, after some life or lives in being at [the] time of creation of [the] interest." Id. at 1195. As
technology progresses and frozen embryos remain viable in storage for longer periods, the risk
of attempting to control one's estate by naming a frozen embryo as a life in being increases.
Such a development would defeat the purpose of the Rule. For an excellent discussion of the
Rule Against Perpetuities see BERGIN & HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FuTURE INTERESTS, ch. 8 (2nd ed. 1984).
155. In re Custody of Carlisle, 225 Pa. Super. 181, 310 A.2d 280 (1973).
156. See generally, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
157. See Sherwyn & Handel v. Cal. State Dep't of Social Serv., 173 Cal. App.3d 52,
218 Cal. Rptr. 778, 781 (1985).
158. The custody laws of this country are too numerous and complex to consider in this
Comment. The intent is simply to alert the reader to the custody issues and the problems that
could result from treating the frozen embryo as a child in divorce situations.
159. See State ex rel. Abajian v. Dennett, 15 Misc. 2d 260, 184 .N.Y.S.2d 178 (1958)
(Husband and wife divorced in 1956; she remarried in 1957 and then refused to allow her exhusband visitation rights to their two children. He brought suit to enforce his rights under the
divorce decree. In response to his suit, his ex-wife claimed, for the first time, that the children
had been created through artificial insemination and that her ex-husband was not the father.
The court enforced the husband's visitation rights.).
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be backed up by current custody and support laws, gives a vindictive
party a potent weapon. One party's threat to ask for destruction or
donation of the embryos can also be a potent weapon, especially
since divorce is an emotional situation where logical and considered
decisions can be difficult to make.
VI. An Alternative Solution: The Frozen Embryo Is Neither Property Nor A Human Being
Scientifically and medically, it is illogical to consider a frozen
embryo to be a human being. When fertilization occurs through sexual intercourse, "70% to 80% of all fertilized ova, and 50% to 70%
of all embryos fail to develop into a pregnancy that results in a live
birth."' 160 A frozen embryo faces a 35% chance of death during
thawing,"" an 85% chance of failing to implant successfully,"6 2 and
an additional 11.5% to 45.4% chance of spontaneous abortion after
implantation. 6 3 This means that for each one-hundred frozen embryos, sixty-five will survive thawing, ten will successfully implant,
and only five to eight will be born alive. Since the number of ova
from one woman that are collected, fertilized, and frozen is generally
fewer than ten, 6 4 and since each embryo statistically has a 5 to 8%
chance of being born alive, the odds weigh heavily against each embryo. To accord human status and rights to an organism
that has a
65
92-95% chance of death before birth defies logic.
No justice is served by subjecting the frozen embryos' parents,
and the legal system to the costs and heartaches of what should be a
very private matter. The potential legal battles over the human status of an organism consisting of four to eight cells that are unlikely
to reach birth seems most unjust. These cells derive human status
from the presence of the requisite number of chromosomes necessary
to define a human. These chromosomes are present in every body
cell, including shed skin-cells, human hair, and finger-nail clippings."' It is absurd to suggest that as technology advances and
cloning of coniplex species becomes successful, our shed body cells
160. Dickey, supra note 47, at 335.
161. Id. at 333.
162. Id. at 324-25.
163. Id.
164. Seibel, supra note 3, at 829.
165. See supra notes 160-63.
166. "The normal number of chromosomes is constant for each species, being 46 in man
(23 pairs in all somatic cells)." TABER'S, supra note 2, at 355. The fact that genetic structure
is unique in each individual is the very thing that makes DNA fingerprinting possible. Vogel,
supra note 30, at 46.
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will acquire human status simply because they too possess the requisite DNA necessary to constitute human life.
Scientifically and medically, it takes much more than the correct number of chromosomes to be a human being. The present or
past ability to maintain independent vital functions (heartbeat, respiration, temperature and brainwaves) is, more logically, the necessary
starting indicia. It makes little legal or common sense to imbue a
frozen embryo with characteristics that it then loses at implantation
and does not acquire again until viability.167 To do so is to create a
legal fiction to assuage the current notions of morality. That fiction
cannot be logically justified.
A frozen embryo is, however, clearly something more than property, despite the fact that the law recognizes that an individual has
some rights in his or her own body that are termed property or
quasi-property interests. 6 8 The law's creation of a concept of quasiproperty in this context is simply an attempt to describe some right
or rights that obviously and intuitively exist, but are difficult to
name. To label body parts or frozen embryos as property or quasi
property is another attempt to fit a square peg into the proverbial
round hole; it still does not fit. Widespread litigation has ensued in
an effort to define those characteristics of property that a "thing"
does or does not possess.1 6 It is better to simply admit that a body
part is a body part and a frozen embryo is a frozen embryo. Each
has characteristics that resemble property, in addition to characteristics that make it clearly something more.
The litigation that will ensue as a result of characterizing a frozen embryo as either property or human will inevitably plague the
judicial system until legislative action gives the courts some statutory
law to apply. As the technology is more widely used, frozen embryos
will become an issue in more divorce actions. It is time to establish a
policy for the disposition of frozen embryos before the judicial landscape is littered with disparate holdings.
A policy to deal with the disposition of frozen embryos should
be created based upon common sense, fairness, and simple justice. A
frozen embryo is human tissue; it deserves respect. In the event of a
divorce, fairness should be paramount. If either marital partner becomes sterile after the creation of frozen embryos, that partner
167. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. The courts term this interest a property or quasi-property interest because one's body parts do have some, but not all of the characteristics of property.
169. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
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should have the first right to use the embryos. Fairness demands that
the sterile partner, whose only chance for biological offspring rests in
the genetic structure of the frozen embryos, have the first opportunity to use them. If the sterile partner is able to achieve a successful
birth, and any frozen embryos remain, the other partner should have
the option to use the remaining embryos. If the sterile partner does
not want to use any of the embryos, then the other partner should be
given the opportunity to do so.
Absent sterility of one partner, the woman should be given the
first option to use the embryos. She has taken the greater risk to her
own life in their creation.1 7 In an effort to produce the embryos, she
has undergone the administration of powerful hormones, anesthesia,
and surgery, each with potentially serious side effects and complications. The male has undertaken minimal physical risk; his contribution involves no medication or invasive procedure. Considering the
risk that each partner has taken to produce the embryos, in fairness
the woman should have the first option to use the frozen embryos. If
she achieves a successful birth, the male should then have the opportunity to use any remaining embryo to attempt pregnancy with a
surrogate or a subsequent wife.
If neither partner wishes to use the embryos, and if both parties
agree, the embryos could be donated for implantation into another
woman. If either parent disagrees, the embryos should not be
donated. Although an unwed mother may, in some situations, have
the right to place her child for adoption without the consent of the
child's father,' adoption involves a child who is in fact alive. The
state has a valid interest in permitting the mother to allow adoption
of a child that is already living and is in need of physical and emotional care. The same is not necessarily true of a frozen embryo. The
embryo has not yet acquired the characteristics that make the state
termination of one parent's rights a reasonable act. A blood donor
gives blood knowing that he or she has no control over the selection
of a recipient of that blood. A frozen embryo is created with the
intent to use it personally, not with the expectation that it will be
given to another. The intent behind the creation of a frozen embryo
170. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
171. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (adoption of illegitimate child without
consent of natural father did not violate the father's equal protection or due process rights);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (requiring only mother's consent for adoption of
illegitimate child does not violate the father's rights). But see Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380 (1979) (statute overly broad which treats all fathers of illegitimate children as presumptively less qualified or entitled than mothers).
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is that the parties to its creation will use it; that intent should be
given effect.
If neither party wishes to donate or to use the frozen embryos,
the embryos should remain in storage for a reasonable amount of
time. This gives the parties time to reconsider their decisions. Alternatively, the embryos could be removed from storage and disposed
of. If both parties agree to removal, their wishes should be carried
out. If either party disagrees, however, the embryos should remain in
storage.
It should not be forgotten that frozen embryos may be used as
weapons in a divorce. Therefore, if either divorcing party wishes to
use the embryos, the resulting child should be that party's responsibility. If the other parent wants to be involved with the child, he or
she should be accorded parental rights and obligations. If, however,
the nonusing parent does not wish to be a parent, he or she should
simply be regarded as a sperm or egg donor without any parental
rights or responsibilities. Because frozen embryos are created with
the expectation that the marriage will continue and that parenthood
will be part of the marriage, if no children are born at the time of
the divorce, the unwilling partner should not be forced into
parenthood. Few people expect or want to become a parent with an
ex-spouse. That expectation should be respected.
These suggested policies attempt to balance the interests of the
creators of the frozen embryo, and to give the respect a potential
child deserves. None of the suggestions are perfect, and not all are
fair to each party. This is simply not possible. The issues must, however, be identified and considered, for these cases will arrive before
the courts in increasing numbers. Ultimately the courts will have to
respond.
V.

Conclusion

The solution to these problems, it can be argued, belongs with
the legislature rather than the courts. When technology moves ahead
of the courts and of legislatures, however, it is axiomatic that the
courts will be forced to deal with them first. Rather than live with a
solution based upon emotional reactions to individual moral beliefs,
it is time to develop a theory describing the appropriate treatment of
frozen embryos. It is essential that this theory be grounded in logic
and reason. If logic and reason are ignored in favor of emotional
reaction, the result may be a chaotic tangle of irreconcilable judicial
decisions and needless expense and strife for the parties involved. It
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is better to focus the discussion now, develop the issues and theory
now, and place considered and logical arguments before the courts
and legislatures.
Wendy Dullea Bowie

